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Latino Voters 2012 and Beyond: Will the Fastest Growing
and Evolving Electoral Group Shape U.S. Politics?
Sylvia R. Lazos

Marisa A. Abrajano and R. Michael Alvarez, New
Faces New Voices: The Hispanic Electorate in
America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton U. Press, 2010,
232 pp., $28.95 (cloth).
Marisa A. Abrajano, Campaigning to the New
American Electorate: Advertising to Latino Voters.
Stanford, CA: Stanford U. Press, 2010, 216 pp.,
$21.95 (paperback).

T

wo recent books on the Latino electorate by political scientist Marisa Abrajano,
one co-authored with Michael Alvarez, take on the
timely task of studying Latino electorate behavior.
These books are part of a growing literature that scientifically studies the evolving Latino electorate,
and attempts to answer difficult questions about
this ethnic group’s electorate cohesiveness and
how candidates might be able to influence the Latino electorate. As Professors Abrajano and Alvarez
point out, political scientists are only beginning to
understand this group’s behavior (A and A, pp.
181–183).1
Why study Latino voters? The first reason is
growth and size. Latino population growth over
the last decade outstripped expectations,2 and
accounted for 50% of the U.S. growth over the
2000 to 2010 decade.3 Latinos are now the largest
minority group in the United States, according to
the 2010 Census, numbering 50.5 million or 16%
of the total population.4 By comparison, African
Americans represent 12% and Asian Americans
5% of the total population.5 Latino voting power
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is not proportionate to their share of the population:
Latinos represented only 7% of all voters in 2010.6
Latinos’ proportion of voters relative to their population size is low for two reasons. First, Latinos are
the most youthful demographic group with a
median age of 27.7 About 35% are under age 18
and are not eligible to vote, the highest proportion
among any demographic ethnic/racial group. Second, a high proportion of Latinos are noncitizens.8
One in three Latino of voting age is a noncitizen.9
By contrast only 7% of the white adult population is made up of non-citizens.10 Third, Latinos

1

Throughout this review, citations to Abrajano and Alvarez’s
New Faces New Voices are referenced as ‘‘A and A’’ with the
page number, and citations to Abrajano’s Campaigning to
the New American Electorate are referenced as ‘‘A’’ with the
page number.
2Daily Mail Reporter, U.S. Hispanic Population Growth Outstrips
Census Estimates, Daily Mail, Mar. 16, 2011, http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1366667/U-S-Hispanic-populationgrowth-outstrips-Census-estimates.html#ixzz1azrykCvV.
3Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Mark Lopez, Census 2010:
50 Million Latinos—Hispanics Account for More Than Half
of Nation’s Growth in Past Decade, Pew Hispanic Center,
Mar. 24, 2011.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Mark Hugo Lopez, The Latino Electorate in 2010: More
Voters, More Non-Voters, Pew Hispanic Center, Apr. 26,
2011.
7
Passel et al., supra note 3, at 1. By comparison, the median is
31 for African Americans, 36 for Asian ethnic groups, and 41
for whites. The study also concluded that two-thirds of all Latinos aged 16 to 25 in the country were born in the United
States, a challenge to the perception that a majority of Latinos
are immigrants.
8
Id.
9
U. S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election
of November 2010, Table 2, available at http://www.census
.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/index.html.
10Id.
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have the lowest voter turnout among registered voters of all racial and ethnic/racial groups.11
Nonetheless, Latino growth promises to reshape
the U.S. electorate for the foreseeable future. Each
month 200,000 Latinos turn 18. Fully 98% of
these are native born, and are eligible voters.12
This growth has momentum. Even if immigration
totally stops tomorrow, according to demographers’
projections, Latino growth will exceed the growth
of whites, African Americans, and Asians in the
coming decade.13
Second, Latinos have shown themselves to be a
swing electoral group in key states. Latino voters
represent a large enough share of the voters that
they can influence the electoral outcome in New
Mexico (41% (based on 2008 data)), Florida
(14%), Colorado (13%), and Nevada (15%).14 In
addition, Latinos represent a large voting block in
states with large electoral votes—California
(18%), Texas (20%), and Arizona (16%).15 The Latino vote was solidly Democratic in the 2008 election.16 Political scientists Matt Barreto, Loren
Collingwood, and Sylvia Manzano credit the Latino
vote with influencing the election in favor of President Obama in 2008.17
A careful read of Abrajano’s recent books brings
additional understanding to Latino voter behavior,
and by implication, how this key group will influence the electoral game in 2012 and beyond. The
main message of these texts is that the Latino vote
is complex and evolving (A and A, pp. 181–185)
and not easy to shoehorn into existing frameworks.18

ARE LATINO VOTERS A DISTINCT
AND COHESIVE VOTING GROUP?
One of the first questions that Abrajano and
Alvarez take on in New Faces, New Voices is
whether the Latino electorate is a distinctive and
cohesive electoral group. This is a question that
has vexed various political scientists and sociologists, because as the authors point out, the very
term ‘‘Hispanic’’ is ‘‘socially constructed’’ (A and
A, p. 10)—specifically, constructed by government
bureaucrats at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Only
one in four Latinos describe themselves as ‘‘Hispanic’’
or ‘‘Latino;’’ the majority describe themselves by
their nation of origin (e.g., Puerto Rican, Mexican
American, Nicaraguan) (A and A, p. 22). National

119

origin identification remains an important identifier because it captures common group histories in
the United States. For example, Cubans have a common group history of being political exiles and of
more generous treatment under U.S. immigration
laws. By contrast, Mexicans’ common history
leads them to claim that the ‘‘border crossed us,’’
because the 1848 U.S.-Mexico War led to the U.S.
annexation of the Mexican territory that now comprises California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New
Mexico, Arizona, and Texas under the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. Puerto Rico was annexed as a
territory as a result of the Spanish American War
in 1898, and the citizens of Puerto Rico are U.S.
citizens by birthright per congressional statute.
In addition each national origin subgroup traditionally has been geographically concentrated in
different regions of the country. Puerto Ricans in
the Northeast and Florida, Cubans in Florida, and
Mexican Americans in the Southwest and California.
These different histories and immigration trajectories in the United States have meant that Latino
identity as a cohesive electoral group has been difficult to achieve.19
What, then, is transforming Latinos into a political group?

11

Lopez, supra note 6.
Leo Estrada, The 2010 Census—What the Numbers Mean and
How Funders Can Respond, Hispanics in Philanthropy Lab
Webinar, Oct. 3, 2011.
13
Id.
14
Mark Lopez, The Hispanic Vote in 2008 Election, Pew Hispanic Trust, Nov. 5, 2011, at Fig. 2.
15
Id. See also infra note 17.
16
Id.
17
Matt Barreto, Loren Collingwood, and Sylvia Manzano,
Measuring Latino Political Influence in National Elections,
63 Pol. Res. Q. 4, (Dec. 2010). This research applies a composite index based on size of Latino population, growth in registration, increased rates in partisan cohesiveness, media focus,
and mobilization. The authors conclude that the Latino votes
had the greatest influence in Florida, Nevada, Colorado, and
New Mexico. Texas and Arizona were states that demonstrated
‘‘considerable influence’’ by Latino voters. Id. at 10.
18
See Sylvia Lazos Vargas, The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post2000: What Does it Mean to Move Beyond ‘‘Black and
White’’ Politics? 81 Ore. L. Rev. 784 (2002).
19
Luis Ricardo Fraga, John Garcia, Rodney Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and
Gary Segura, Latino Lives In America: Making It
Home 71 (2010) (reporting that 47% of Latinos in 2002
National Latino Survey reported intragroup discrimination as
a ‘‘major problem’’).
12
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Spanish language
Like other scholars,20 Abrajano and Alvarez
point to Spanish language. Latinos are distinctive
in their belief that it is important for Latinos as an
ethnic group in the United States to hold on to
their language. Three out of four first and second
generation Latinos believe it is important for future
generations of Latinos to speak Spanish, while a
majority of third generation Latinos so believe (A
and A, p. 30). At the same time, Latinos believe
in language assimilation; an overwhelming supramajority believe that learning English is important
in order to assimilate into the mainstream (A and
A, pp. 32–33). Regardless of their individual
national origin, Latinos believe in assimilation on
their own terms—become part of the mainstream,
but retain your culture and national identity through
language.
Language is an important marker of what Abrajano calls political assimilation as well. In Abrajano’s study of how advertising influences Latino
voting behavior, Campaigning to the New Electorate, she describes how Latino’s language ability
can predict voting behavior and political sophistication. Her analysis divides Latinos into Spanishdominant and English-dominant—those who
primarily watch or listen to Spanish media and
those who prefer the latter. Spanish-dominant Latino voters can be described as relatively new to
the political process with little political knowledge.
By contrast, English-dominant voters are more
politically and culturally incorporated, and electorally behave in ways similar to the majority culture
voters (A, pp. 14–20). This finding may seem intuitive, but Abrajano makes an important contribution by empirically demonstrating the relationship
between language and political knowledge/behavior.
Language then may be both a cultural identifier
(language helps Latinos retain their distinctive culture) and a signifier of how politically assimilated
Latinos are (the less assimilated are less likely to
lose the ability to speak Spanish and less politically knowledgeable). Language, in and of itself,
is not necessarily an attribute that creates political
consciousness.
Ethnic tribalism
Latinos report that they are likely to vote for
another Latino candidate. Let us call this attribute
of voting for a co-ethnic candidate, ‘‘ethnic tribal-
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ism.’’ Self-reported ‘‘ethnic tribalism’’ is stronger
for first generation (80%) than for second generation (66%) of Latinos, according to Alvarez and
Abrajano (A and A, p. 27).
Professor Randy Kennedy’s recent book, The
Persistence of the Color Line, analyzes President
Obama’s 2008 campaign and the importance of
racial tribalism in this election.21 Candidate
Obama was able to court the ‘‘middle’’ white and
independent vote, without having to make any
overt policy concessions to his own racial group,
African Americans, because he heavily relied on
racial tribalism to deliver to him this important segment of the Democratic electorate. Because of
racial tribalism, no overt message or substantive
policy concessions were necessary to the African
American electorate. Such a move might have identified Obama as a ‘‘black candidate’’ and triggered
inter-racial competitiveness and emotional negative
racial stereotypes22 that would have turned off many
white voters. Being seen as ‘‘too black’’ would have
lost Obama any chance to a substantial share of the
white vote. Rather, to secure the black vote, Obama
relied on implicit racial tribalism (African Americans were willing to withstand a great deal of policy
positioning that did not directly favor them in order
to elect the first African American president), and
subtle symbolic messaging.
Is this a playbook for a Latino candidate?
Although Alvarez and Abrajano raise the tantalizing
possibility that Latinos will strongly favor co-ethnic
candidates, they do not develop this strain of Latino
electorate distinctiveness. Just how loyal will Latino
Republicans be to a Latino Democrat, or vice versa?
In the 2008 Nevada elections, Republican gubernatorial Latino candidate Brian Sandoval only garnered 15% of the Latino co-ethnic vote;23 by

20

See, e.g., Matt Barreto, Ethnic Cues: The Role of
Shared Ethnicity in Latino Political Participation
(2010).
21
Randall Kennedy, The Persistence of the Color
Line: Racial Politics and the Obama Presidency (2011).
22
Drew Westen, The Political Brain (2007). The author
reports that he advised candidate Obama to frame his appeals
to the white electorate so that the political dialogue would
engage the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that engages
in complex reasoning, and stay away from intuitive thinking, which would trigger negative emotions around racial
stereotypes.
23
Even with Sandoval, Latino Vote Still Not on GOP Side, FoxReno.com, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.foxreno.com/news/news/
even-with-sandoval-latino-vote-still-not-on-gop-si/nDh3T.
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contrast, 75% of the Latino vote went to Democrat
presidential candidate Obama.24 Pointing to this
case, a Latino Republican strategist recently
claimed, ‘‘Latinos do not vote surnames.’’25
Professor Matt Barreto in his recent book, Ethnic
Cues, concludes that there is strong co-ethnicity
loyalty among Latino voters. Barreto presents statistical multivariate analysis of mayoral elections in
five major cities from 2000 to 2006, congressional
elections and Bill Richardson’s 2008 presidential
run. The results leads Barreto to conclude that coethnicity is a ‘‘significant predictor’’ of Latino
voter choice, with co-ethnicity having ‘‘roughly
the same effect as issue preference’’ in explaining
Latino voters’ choices.26 Co-ethnicity also had a
significant effect in influencing Latino voter choice
in favor of a co-ethnic crossover candidate.27 Barreto also finds that a viable co-ethnic candidate on
the ballot positively influences Latino voter turnout.28 This study concludes that Latinos could
form a cohesive electoral group around the politics
of electing ‘‘one of their own’’ to office in elections
where Latinos represent a significant share of the
electorate (10% or more) and there is a viable Latino candidate.29

and A, pp. 46–48). The Spring 2006 immigration
marches were the largest civil rights mobilization
in the history of American civil rights. Over three
months, an estimated up to five million people
poured into the streets.31 The 2006 marches were
spurred by the Republican majority in the House
of Representatives’ attempt to enact HR 4437, a
bill that enacted harsh measures against unauthorized immigrants and would have criminalized
assistance to unauthorized immigrants. Marches
spontaneously took place over three months in
New York, Boston, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Dallas, Houston, Las Vegas, and major cities in
every state, reaching a climax on May Day 2006.32
The fervor of the 2006 immigrant movement has
not subsided. This is because states continue to be
concerned about the numbers of unauthorized
immigrants within their borders, and have passed
immigration enforcement laws that target unauthorized immigrants and those who might assist
them.33 Civil rights demonstrators have protested
Arizona’s SB 1070, which among other things
authorizes police officers to stop any person about
whom they have reasonable grounds to suspect
may be an unauthorized immigrant. Immigrant

Racial/ethnic backlash
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Another factor that Alvarez and Abrajano speculate may forge Latinos into a cohesive electoral
group is ‘‘stigma,’’ which the authors state is closely
related to power and being identified as a racial
minority (A and A, p. 20). In an otherwise thorough
study, the authors’ exposition as to how ‘‘stigma’’
is an important factor in molding political selfawareness is suggested but not explored in depth.
This is probably due to the nature of Alvarez and
Abrajano’s approach, which hues closely to statistics and analyzes existing databases. As with any
statistical approach that is limited to available data,
the analysis may not capture important dynamics.
Racial politics, specifically the antagonism of the
majority towards unauthorized immigrants, is now
playing a very important role in awakening racial
and political consciousness among Latinos.30 It is
this recent awakened racial consciousness around
immigration politics that may provide the best
account as to why Latinos are becoming a cohesive
voter group.
Abrajano and Alvarez briefly discuss the importance of the 2006 Immigration Rights Marches (A

Lopez, supra note 6.
Jeri Clausing, GOP Showcasing Hispanic Stars, AP, Oct. 16,
2011.
26
Barreto, supra note 20, at 83.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 114 (examining data for mayoral elections).
29
Id at 155–56.
30
See generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Emerging Latina/o
Nation and Anti-Immigrant Backlash, 7 Nev. L. J. 685, 707
(2007).
31
See Xochitl Bada, et al. Immigrant Rights Marches
(2006); Anita Revilla, Las Vegas Activist Crew and the Immigrant Rights Movement: How We Transformed ‘‘Sin City,’’ in
Margarita Berta-Avila, Anita Tijerina-Revilla, and
Julie Figueroa (eds.), Marching Students: Chicana
and Chicano Activism (2011); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, The
Immigrant Rights Marches (Las Marchas): Did the ‘‘Gigante’’
(Giant) Wake up or Does it Still Sleep Tonight?, 7 Nev. L. J.
779 (2007).
32
See Lazos, supra note 31, at 781.
33
The anti-unauthorized immigrant movement points to the federal government’s inability to stem unauthorized immigration,
which is now estimated at 10.8 million nationally. Jeffery Passel
and D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are
Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade, Pew Hispanic Center, Sept.
1, 2010. However, scholars are split over whether local immigration enforcement is wise policy. Compare Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, Missouri, the ‘‘War on Terrorism,’’ and Immigrants:
Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 775 (2002) with
Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Reform, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008).
25
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rights advocates and Latino communities also mobilized around other similar laws, like Alabama’s HB
56, perhaps the most draconian of these local immigration enforcement laws, passed in 2011 by a
Republican majority in the legislature and signed
into law by a Republican governor.34
As Abrajano and Alvarez point out, survey data
show that Latinos are highly aware of the mass
movement nature of the 2006 marches. Over 60%
of Latinos reported that they viewed the 2006 immigrant rights protests as the beginning of an important political movement (A and A, pp. 95–98).
Latino youth, who are the growth engine of the Latino electorate, widely participated in the 2006
marches.35 According to poll data, over 60% of
youth (18 to 29) who were likely voters either participated in the 2006 immigration marches or
knew someone who did (A and A, p. 96).36
However, Abrajano and Alvarez do not credit the
immigration marches as a bona fide civil rights
movement37 that is influencing the political consciousness of Latinos, particularly young Latinos
who are the biggest growth factor in the Latino
voter block. This again may be due to their statistical methodology. Perhaps Abrajano and Alvarez are
being cautious and wish not to over-generalize. Specifically, the 2006 and the ongoing immigrant civil
rights movement is made up of not only Latinos,
but also religious communities, worker rights’ organizations, and traditional civil rights groups.38
Nonetheless, the anti-unauthorized immigrant
local enforcement movement merits the attention
of political scientists studying Latino voter behavior, because it was a pivotal event in raising Latinos’
racial and consequently political consciousness,39
because 1) the anti-immigrant rhetoric that accompanies the desire to improve local immigration
enforcement is hostile and generalized, 2) heavyhanded enforcement disproportionately impacts
Latino communities, and 3) discrimination against
Latinos has increased, which in turn influences
voter behavior. In sum, Latinos now see themselves
as a minority under siege.40
1. Anti-immigrant
rhetoric. Anti-immigrant
rhetoric cuts with a broad swath. The rants are generalized—‘‘Mexicans go home.’’ ‘‘Why don’t you
speak English?’’ This rhetoric is not just against unauthorized immigrants, but it is also anti-Latino, attacking Latinos’ cultural language, and Latinos’ claim
to belonging to the larger American community.41
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The result is that Latinos increasingly see themselves
as outsiders, rather than just another immigrant group
that is increasingly becoming incorporated and
assimilated into American society.
Terms such as ‘‘illegals’’ or ‘‘illegal aliens’’ boil
down the debate to a legal question—does an individual qualify under immigration law to live and
work in the United States. The term ‘‘illegals’’
strips the human component from the complex
human, social, and economic issues that permeate immigration law. The premise behind ‘‘what
part of illegal don’t you understand?’’ is that all
unauthorized are law-breakers, and should be
immediately deported. Their contributions to this
country, their family ties, the communities that
they have built, should not ameliorate the legal
consequences of entering this country as an unauthorized immigrant.
Most Latinos are able to see the human side of
this policy debate. Latinos are predominantly an
immigrant community (40% are foreign born).42
In the immigrant marches, the sentiment that the
immigration issue needed to be framed in humanistic terms, rather than just legalistic ones, was seen in
the signs that read ‘‘Illegals are human beings.’’43
Close community ties make the empathy gap

34

Patrik Jonsson, Alabama Life Already Changing under Tough
Immigration Law, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 29, 2011.
35
See Lazos, supra note 31 (describing youth leadership in the
Los Angeles and Las Vegas immigration rights marches);
Revilla, supra note 31 (describing youth leadership and political activism).
36
Mark Hugo Lopez, Rich Morin, and Paul Taylor, Illegal
Immigration Backlash Worries, Divides Latinos, Pew Hispanic
Center, Oct. 28, 2010.
37
See generally Kevin R. Johnson and Bill Ong Hing, The
Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a
New Civil Rights Movement, 42 Harv. CR-CL 99 (2007).
38
In 2006, each city’s immigrant rights marches had its own
organizational structure. However, religious groups, students,
and worker rights groups formed the core of the movement.
See Lazos, supra note 31, at 786–812. In Alabama, the Episcopal Church, United Methodist Church, and Roman Catholic
Church filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of HB
56, saying it violated immigrants’ rights to free speech, assembly, and religious practice. Valeria Fernandez, HB 56 Reigniting
Civil Rights Movement in Alabama, New America Media,
Oct. 14, 2011.
39
Lazos, supra note 33, at 819.
40
Id.
41
Bill Ong Hing, Defining America Through Immigration Policy (2004).
42
U.S. Census, Race and Hispanic Origin of the Foreign-Born
Population in the United States: 2007, Jan. 20, 2010.
43
Lazos, supra note 31, at 819.
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narrow to almost nonexistent. Unauthorized immigrants could be family members, friends’ children,
church members, or neighbors. According to a
2010 poll, over 80% of U.S. Latinos agree that
immigrants contribute to American society.44 The
same proportion opposes policies that deport unauthorized immigrants.45
2. Spillover. Latinos do not necessarily want to
be conflated with unauthorized immigrants. Polls
reflect Latinos’ mixed feelings towards unauthorized immigrants. Recent poll data show that only
30% of Latinos believe that unauthorized immigrants are a positive benefit to U.S. society, 46 a substantial drop from 50% from three years earlier.47
Opponents of SB 1070 and HB 54 have argued
that these laws encourage racial profiling because
of the stereotype that unauthorized immigrants are
Latinos. This stereotype is based on the empirical
facts that four in five unauthorized immigrants are
of Hispanic origin.48 The stereotype, however, has
become a myth—that most Latinos are ‘‘illegals’’—particularly those who speak English with
an accent. Although the vast majority of the Latino
population are native born and legal residents, three
in four Americans believe that immigrants are
‘‘illegal.’’49
If law enforcement officers similarly have
absorbed these stereotypes and myths, then Latinos
may be disproportionately impacted by racial profiling. Local immigration enforcement laws, like SB
1070 and HB 54, require police officers and state
workers (teachers, drivers license clerks, medical
personnel) to be vigilant as to who might be unauthorized, and report their reasonable suspicions to
local law enforcement. The rational Bayesian—a
person who relies on probabilities50—would focus
on someone who looks Latino because of the statistics that most unauthorized immigrants are of Hispanic origin. Even if such action is ‘‘rational,’’ it
is nonetheless racial profiling that disproportionately impacts native and legal resident Latinos. Professor Jody Armour has argued that this kind of
racial profiling may be rational but it is not reasonable because of its consequences of error.51
The consequences are that many ‘‘innocent’’ Latinos will be disproportionately impacted if law
enforcement is untrained and proceeds on stereotypes. In other words, the error rate of ‘‘stops’’ for
suspicion of a Latino being unauthorized will be
very large (because the stop is based on a stereotype
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or conduct based on a stereotype), relative to accurate stops and arrests (the number of unauthorized is
small relative to the much larger number of Latinos
who are native and authorized immigrants). Recent
national poll data support the proposition that Latinos are increasingly being racially profiled. One in
ten Latinos report they have been stopped and asked
by police or other authorities about their immigration status.52 Latinos now believe that laws such
as SB 1070 give too much power to local law
enforcement officials.53
Laws like SB 1070 direct law enforcement to
focus on behavioral clues to determine if a person
is ‘‘reasonably’’ suspected of being an unauthorized
immigrant. The question then arises, what are such
behavioral clues? Looking nervous around law
enforcement? Looking ‘‘foreign’’? Speaking English with an accent? Wearing a soccer shirt from
a Mexican or Salvadoran national team? All these
‘‘behavioral cues’’ border on racial and cultural stereotyping, rather than conduct. In areas of ambiguity,
and without proper training, law enforcement, like
other persons, will rely on unconscious stereotypes
and make decisions that ‘‘lean’’ in favor of the stereotype. In a series of well-known studies, Professor
Joshua Correll and fellow cognitive psychologists demonstrated that untrained citizens unconsciously associated crime with African Americans,
and were much more likely to shoot at figures
who were African Americans when the figure had
made an ambiguous motion that could not be

44

Lopez, Morin, and Taylor, supra note 36, at Fig. 5.
Id. at 7.
46
Lopez, Morin, and Taylor, supra note 36, at Fig. 6. Similar
proportions say that the impact of these immigrants is negative
(31%) or that there has been no effect one way or the other
(30%).
47
2007 National Survey of Latinos: As Illegal Immigration
Issue Heats Up Hispanics Feel a Chill Pew Hispanic Center,
Dec. 13, 2007.
48
Passel and Cohn, supra note 33, at Fig. 3.
49
In a 2007 CBS/NYT survey 75% of non-immigrant Americans said they thought most immigrants were ‘‘illegal.’’
50
Jody Armour, Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism:
The Hidden Costs of Being Black in America (1997).
51
Id. at 46–49. Professor Armour explains that ‘‘humiliation
and stigmatization must be counted among the most painful
costs of race based suspicions.[that should not] be trivialized.’’ Id. at 53.
52
Mark Hugo Lopez and Susan Minushkin, 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanics See their situation in US Deteriorating: Oppose Key Immigration Enforcement Measures, Pew
Hispanic Center, Sept. 18, 2008.
53
Id.
45
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clearly discerned as threatening.54 By contrast,
police officers who had received training on shoot/
don’t shoot decisions were much less likely to
shoot at ambiguous black figures.55 These studies
show that professional training on stereotypes is
key to just enforcement. Without training, stereotypes in the heads of law enforcement will have
‘‘real life’’ consequences.
How communities perceive that they are treated
by law enforcement has a chilling effect on their
sense of community,56 lessening trust in authority
and heightening the sense of being a target of discrimination and outsiders. The disproportionate
impact of immigration enforcement laws on the Latino community and the perceived unfairness should
be viewed as a key factor in raising political consciousness.57 Alvarez and Abrajano miss this
important dynamic that is impacting Latino voting
behavior today.
3. Discrimination. Not all discrimination is the
same. The most acute kind of discrimination is
when there is no empathy felt towards a group and
when this group is viewed as incompetent or useless.58 When a group is low on warmth and low
on competence, the emotion associated is disgust
and contempt.59 In turn, the emotion of contempt
dehumanizes members of that group,60 making it
virtually impossible that members of the majority
group will empathize with the scorned group.
Illegal or unauthorized immigrants are one of the
most scorned groups in American society, according
to measures based on a model that measures both
stereotypes and emotions, developed by social psychologist Susan Fiske and her collaborators.61
Using interview and focus group data, Fiske and
her collaborators have mapped where various disfavored groups stand in American society.62 According to these data homeless people are the most
scorned group in American society, with unauthorized immigrants falling in the same grouping as
the homeless.63 Documented immigrants are perceived similar to Americans,64 but unauthorized
immigrants are subject to contemptuous prejudice,
‘‘encompassing anger, contempt, disgust, hate and
resentment.’’65
In another study using survey and focus group
data, political scientist Deborah Schildkraut found
that resentment against immigrants is rooted in personal beliefs about traditional norms and values
associated with American national civic commu-
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nity.66 Americans who resent immigrants view
them as not committed to the overall public civic

54

Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, and Bernd
Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. Personality and Soc. Psych. 1314, (2002) (using videogames,
researchers study the effect of ethnicity on shoot/don’t shoot
decisions on untrained civilians. Subjects were more likely to
shoot at African American targets who made ambiguous movements).
55
Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, Tracie
Keese, Melody Sadler, and Bernd Wittenbrink, Across the
Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision
to Shoot , 92 J. Personality and Soc. Psych. 1006 (2007)
(study of Denver law enforcement officers, sample of citizens,
and college students showed that law enforcement officers were
less likely to shoot at black figures who made ambiguous movements than the untrained samples of subjects).
56
Armour, supra note 50, at 52–53.
57
See Lazos, supra note 33, at 817–20.
58
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community, and as refusing to assimilate by holding
themselves separate from mainstream America and
insisting on their cultural difference.67 In other
words, Americans who believe in the traditional
assimilationist framework and strongly identify
with the American civic community are most likely
to feel resentful towards immigrants. In addition,
another group of Americans resent immigrants for
economic competitive reasons.68 Immigrants are
resented for being willing to work ‘‘too hard’’ making it harder for native Americans to compete
against them.69
Immigrant resentment should be greater against
unauthorized rather than authorized immigrants.
This group is perceived as refusing to follow the
rules of membership in America—they broke the
law when they entered the United States, they hold
themselves separate from American society, and
work ‘‘too hard’’—undermining security and wages
of the true members of the American civic community who themselves have followed the rules.
As noted above, resentment against the stereotypical unauthorized immigrants spills over to Latinos. Latinos perceive that discrimination against
them as a group has increased from 2002 to 2010.
According to the Pew Hispanic Trust surveys,
about six in ten Latinos (61%) said discrimination
against Hispanics is a ‘‘major problem’’ in 2010,
while only 40% thought that this was the case in
2002.70 Approximately three-quarters (76%) of
Spanish-dominant Hispanics say anti-Hispanic
bias is a major problem.71 In another national survey taken in 2006, one in three Latinos report personally having experienced an act of
discrimination in a public accommodation, employment, or private interpersonal setting.72
The reason that this issue of perception of discrimination among Latinos is important is that it
shapes Latino desire for political efficacy. Professor
Schildkraut has found that persons who self-identify
as Latino significantly increase their likelihood of
voting as perceptions of discrimination against
them as individuals increases.73 Thus, viewing
one’s self as part of a distinct ethnic group that is
the object of discrimination and backlash and
could be vulnerable to majority resentment motivates Latino individuals to be more active politically—either to attenuate the negative impacts of being
a victim of discrimination, or as agency, taking individual responsibility for being part of the solution to
a system that seems unfair.74
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Alvarez and Abrajano seem sympathetic to the
perspective that Hispanic political identity in the
United States is not based on a racial identity, and
that this explains Latinos’ overall lower political
participation and political efficacy as compared to
African Americans (A and A, pp. 116–117). Unlike
blacks, Latinos of various national origins do not
share a history of racial subordination and discrimination (id.). They also argue that there is not a single issue that would unite Latinos politically (id.).
However, immigration backlash—enforcement
laws that spill over to Latinos who are native and naturalized American citizens and legal residents—is
providing emerging racial identity for Latinos.

HOW MIGHT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
AMONG LATINOS BE INCREASED?:
WAKING UP THE ‘‘SLEEPING GIANT’’
Still, the mainstream media seems to cast doubt
on the importance of the Latino vote.75 Latino
voter share of the overall electorate continues to
grow representing in 2010 7% of the entire electorate, the highest ever. Yet, Latino voter turnout is the
lowest among the three main racial/ethnic groups in
the United States.76 In 2010, just 31.2% of eligible
Latino voters cast ballots, compared with 48.6%
of whites and 44% of African Americans.77
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While pundits forecasted rapid growth of Latino
voter participation after the 2006 immigrant civil
rights marches, it is unclear whether this has been
the case. For example, in the state of Arizona,
where anti-immigration politics around SB 1070,
have been red hot and polarized the electorate, Latino turnout of eligible registered voters in 2010,
the first election cycle after the enactment of SB
1070, was only 29%, compared to almost 52% for
whites, and almost 40% for African Americans.78
Nonetheless, Latinos’ 2008 29% turnout rate is a
significant rise over the 2008 turnout rate of 24%.79
Advertising
Theoretically, one major method for increasing
Latino involvement and political knowledge would
be through information delivered through advertising. In Campaigning to the New Electorate, Marisa
Abrajano examines how advertising directed to Latinos impacted voter behavior in the 2000–2004
congressional and presidential elections. Using various interview and content analysis of advertisement
data sets, she applies multivariate statistical analysis
to explain how advertising influences Latino voters.
A significant and useful finding of Professor
Abrajano’s work is that advertising can influence
higher turnout among Latinos. She finds that ‘‘exposure to political ads affects the turnout rates of both
English and Spanish dominant Latinos’’ (A, p. 95).
Using multivariate regression analysis, Professor
Abrajano estimates that Spanish advertising will
increase voter turnout among Spanish dominant Latinos by up to 28% (id.). English-dominant Latinos,
who primarily watch or listen to English media,
were also positively influenced by English language
advertising but not as much. English dominant Latino voters increased their likelihood of voting by
9%, when English advertising directed ads specifically targeted at Latinos, either addressing a policy
issue of high interest to Latinos, or where the candidate symbolically identifies with Latinos by
endorsements from Latino personalities. Quixotically, Professor Abrajano points out that Englishdominant voters were negatively impacted in voter
turnout when they were exposed to Spanish-media
advertising (id.).
Structural accommodations
In New Faces, New Voices, Alvarez and Abrajano analyze data from the Current Population Sur-
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vey as to why registered Latinos self-reported as
the reasons that they did not go out to vote. The
top two reasons cited are ‘‘too busy,’’ at almost
24%, and ‘‘registration problems’’ at 11% (A and
A, pp. 86–87).
These reasons are a reflection of Latino population’s demography and class. The Latino population
is younger, works more hours, is more likely to be
employed in manual labor and blue collar jobs,
and is less educated and poorer than the general
population. These are attributes that generally
depress voter turnout (A and A, pp. 86–87). To
increase Latino voter participation, there must be
support structures in place that compensate. For
example, recently non-profit groups as well as
labor unions have put in massive efforts to register
Latinos. A legal solution suggested by Spencer
Overton and others is to allow for same day registration and permit documents such as a high school
graduation degree to serve as legally cognizable
documentation for registering to vote.80
It is troubling that, instead of making it easier
for those with limited economic means and limited
time to register to vote, the recent trend has been
to make voter registration more difficult. The
Brennan Center for Justice has recently published
a report on recent voting law changes, finding
that the move to stricter voter identification will
make it ‘‘significantly harder for more than five
million eligible voters to cast ballots in 2012.’’81
The changes require young voters to provide
photo identification (Alabama, Kansas, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin).82 However, the Brennan Center reports
that 11%, or 21 million American citizens, do not
possess a photo ID.83 Moreover, instead of going
the direction suggested by Professor Overton,
states are now increasingly making registration
harder, reducing opportunities for registration
(Florida, Illinois, Texas, Wisconsin).84
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These laws that make it harder for first time voters to register to vote will have an impact on Latino
voters, unless community and national groups organize efforts to counteract these efforts. Non-profit
groups such as National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) are undertaking a national
campaign to educate potential Latino voters on
voter ID laws.85 NALEO is also embarking on an
ambitious voter registration effort, predicting that
in 2012, 12.2 million Latino voters will cast their
ballots.86 Other non-profit groups that were established in 2008, like Mi Familia Vota, will have
the challenge of registering new voters and helping
new voters meet the requirements of these new laws.
Indications are that the Obama 2012 campaign is
already beginning registration efforts in key electoral states.

THE EDUCATION OF LATINO VOTERS:
THE NEED TO CHANGE THE ‘‘DUMBING IT
DOWN’’ APPROACH TO LATINOTARGETED ADVERTISING
Abrajano’s content analysis of advertising targeted at Latino voters shows that messaging contained in an advertisement differs based on
whether it is advertising prepared for Spanish-dominant Latinos (where advertising occurs in the Spanish media) or English-dominant Latinos (where
advertising occurs in the English media). Spanish
media advertising is characterized by Abrajano as
simplistic, aimed at burnishing the personality traits
of the candidate, and primarily signaling the candidate’s solidarity with Latinos as an ethnic group. (A,
pp. 50–52). Spanish media advertising delivers simple policy messages (A, p. 50), so much so that
Abrajano found that candidates seldom advertised
their policy positions on bilingual education
(under 1% of advertisements) and immigration
(3%)—both of which are issues of great interest to
Latino voters (id. at 51) and have the potential of
influencing the Latino vote.
Dumbing down the education of Latino voters
through advertising has unintended consequences.
Abrajano finds that Spanish-dominant Latino voters
reported significantly greater incorrect answers
about presidential candidates’ qualifications and
ideological positions than did Caucasian or African
American voters (A, pp. 112–14, 128). Abrajano
notes that for the 2004 presidential campaign, a
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majority of Spanish-dominant Latinos were unable
to correctly identify the policy positions of Bush
or Kerry, and often interchanged the positions of
the candidates (A, p. 118). In sum, according to
Abrajano’s study, Spanish media advertising did
not increase Latinos’ knowledge of political issues.
As Abrajano notes, in the 2000 and 2004 campaigns, Spanish media advertisements did ‘‘little
in the way of substantive policy information about
the presidential candidates’’ (A., p. 136). As a result,
Spanish-dominant Latinos are ‘‘less influenced in
their vote decisions by issue positions and ideological beliefs’’ (id.). Because of the ineffectiveness of
campaign advertising to Spanish-dominant Latinos,
Abrajano suggests that Spanish-dominant Latinos
may not actually be voting in a way that is consistent with their policy positions and ideological
beliefs (id.).
By contrast, among English-dominant Latinos,
the group that is more assimilated, political advertisement reinforced their pre-existing beliefs and
political leanings. Their vote choice was highly
influenced by cultural beliefs and the positions
they had taken on hot issues such as abortion, immigration, and education. (A, p. 130–136).
In New Faces, New Voices, Abrajano and
Alvarez analyze 2008 presidential advertising. The
Obama and McCain campaigns spent twice as
much on Spanish media as did previous presidential
candidates in the 2000 and 2004 elections. (A and
A, p. 186). However, the content of advertising
did not stray from previous campaigns. Both candidates stuck to simplistic messaging emphasizing
character and endorsements from Latino personalities (id. at 189).
Thus, no presidential candidate has yet devised a
campaign that addresses Latino voters ‘‘with
respect.’’ Major candidates have not tried to court
the Latino vote by persuasion and showing how
their position on serious policy issues, particularly
education, immigration, and the economy affect Latinos. These issues impact Latinos just as much as
other American voters with whom candidates communicate through the English media at a sophisticated level. Moreover, Abrajano’s analysis implies
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that partisanship and ideological sophistication is
There are also signs that the Republicans are
not being developed among the Latino electorate, thinking about how they can register and court conbecause candidates have chosen not to explain servative Latinos. At the grass roots level, conservawhy Latino vote for the specific candidate would tive Latinos, frustrated with the Republican Party
be aligned with ideological beliefs and policy posi- structure, have begun to organize new groups such
tions that meet the needs of individual Latinos and as ‘‘Café con Leche’’ Republicans.87 Another
group, who call themselves the Tequila Party bills
their community.
Because of Citizens United, the Supreme Court itself as a counter movement to the Tea Party.88
case that eliminated restrictions on advertising by The ‘‘Tequila Party’’ nascent movement is national
corporations and unions, there will be more dollars in scope and is marking out conservative positions
spent on advertising in the 2012 elections. Hope- that speak to Latinos in the three areas that they
fully, this new bounty in advertising will inspire most care about—immigration, the economy, and
‘‘smarter’’ advertising that is aimed at Latinos. Can- education. In sum, in anticipation of 2012, grassdidates should construct more substantive advertis- roots conservative Latino leaders are trying to create
ing campaigns that speak to Latino voters in organizations that separate themselves from the
Spanish-dominant media, and address the issues angry anti-immigrant policy proposals and rhetoric
that matter to Latino voter, the economy, education, that is pushing the Latino vote towards the Demoand immigration policy. The Democratic Party, crats so that Republicans too can court the emerging
which has benefitted from Latino support in the Latino voter.
2008 elections, should also take care to ensure
that their advertisements clearly explain why the
CONCLUSION
party’s policy positions benefit Latino families.
The Republican Party should deploy ‘‘family valProfessors Abrajano and Alvarez have made a
ues’’ campaigns to demonstrate that their party is
valuable contribution to the area of understanding
aligned with Latino cultural beliefs.
There are signs that President Barrack Obama Latino political behavior. As they conclude, this is
may try more sophisticated advertising campaigns a ‘‘distinct.political identity in the United States’’
aimed at the all-important Latino vote in 2012. (A and A, p. 175) that is still in flux and is evolving.
The White House Office of Civic Engagement and They succeed in their overall aim, to ‘‘give a broad
the White House Office on Initiatives on Hispanic overview of Hispanic political behavior’’ (id.). Each
Education have been honing substantive messaging election will provide more information about Latino
on what President Obama has accomplished in his voters and how it finds its ‘‘new voice’’ in the Amerfirst term in the key areas of the economy, educa- ican electorate. This is exciting stuff!
tion, and immigration, and how these policies
have benefitted Latinos. Politically active and EnAddress correspondence to:
glish-dominant Latinos are being courted with
Sylvia R. Lazos
weekly emails from the White House informing
William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV
them of the President’s most recent accomplish4505 South Maryland Parkway
ments. The White House Office on Initiatives on
Box 451003
Hispanic Education has produced white papers on
Las Vegas, NV 89154
the state of Latino education, and the President
E-mail: lazoss@unlv.nevada.edu
has taken strong substantive positions through an
executive order and timely speeches. It remains to
be seen whether email messages, press releases,
and white house papers can be translated into 30 87
and 60 second media spots that educate both the Somos Republicans’ Leader Steps Down, NewsTaco.com,
Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.newstaco.com/2011/11/04/somosEnglish-dominant and Spanish-dominant Latino voter republicans-leader-steps-down.
as to President Obama’s substantive policy positions. 88http://tequilapartytour.com.

